Varieties of Affluence: How Political Attitudes of the Rich Are Shaped by Income or Wealth by Arndt, H.
Varieties of Affluence: How Political Attitudes of
the Rich Are Shaped by Income or Wealth
H. Lukas R. Arndt*
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Paulstraße 3, 50676 Ko¨ln, Germany
*Corresponding author. Email: arndt@mpifg.de
Submitted February 2018; revised January 2019; accepted September 2019
Abstract
Sociological research often uses income as the only indicator to describe or proxy the group of
the rich. This article develops an alternative framework in order to describe varieties of affluence
as three-dimensional: depending on income, wealth, and origin of wealth. The relevance of such a
multidimensional perspective for social outcomes is demonstrated by analysing the heterogeneity in
political attitudes between different varieties of affluence. For this purpose, ordinary least squares
regressions are applied to a sample from 2005, 2009, and 2014 German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP). The main results are, first, that the perspective of varieties of affluence reveals significant
differences in social outcomes as demonstrated by political attitudes. Especially wealth possession is
related to significantly more right political attitudes. Second, there is strong explorative evidence
that the rich in Germany should be regarded as a heterogeneous group. These findings are robust to
influential data, multiple imputations of wealth data, and endogeneity due to pooled data. The article
concludes, among other things, that more data are required to make more certain assertions.
Who Are ‘the Rich’ and Why Does It
Matter?
In recent years, there has been a shift in research on eco-
nomic inequality from a primary interest in income to a
focus on wealth. French economist Thomas Piketty fam-
ously predicted that wealth and its concentration might
generally become increasingly important because the
forecasted low economic growth might lead to decreas-
ing chances of significant wealth accumulation through
labour1 (Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Saez, 2014). His
claim also adds relevance to the multigenerational per-
sistence of wealth. For Germany, a recent study pro-
jected a yearly inheritance volume of up to EUR 400
billion per year until 2024—equivalent to 12.7 per cent
of the GDP in 2016 (Tiefensee and Grabka, 2017). The
share of pre-tax income received by the top 10 per cent
has grown since the 1970s and in 2008 was at its highest
level since 1917 (WID.world, 2017). In 2010, the share
of wealth owned by the top 10 per cent of the wealth
distribution in Germany was the highest in the Eurozone
(Bundesbank, 2013: p. 30). These numbers are a reason
to devote attention to the top income and wealth
holders.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate to what
extent social phenomena can be explained by variation
among three forms of affluence: position in the income
distribution, position in the wealth distribution, and
origin of wealth—self-earned versus not self-earned.
Reasons to make such distinctions are numerous: pos-
sible social-structural differences between these groups
include ambition, family background, ability, migration
background, social class, saving behaviour, and age.
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The question in how far varieties of affluence only signal
such group differences or exert independent direct
effects needs to be answered empirically.2 Political atti-
tudes are chosen here as one example for differing out-
comes because, first, they can be expected to be related
in many ways to individual economic circumstances.
Second, insights into political attitudes among those
with different varieties of affluence might add to existing
research from other disciplines, such as a democratic re-
sponsiveness bias as an indicator of political inequality
(Gilens, 2012: pp. 70–96; Grimes and Esaiasson, 2014;
Bartels, 2016: pp. 233–268; Elsa¨sser, Hense and
Scha¨fer, 2016, 2017).
The increased interest in wealth and the traditional
conceptualization of the affluent as those with high
incomes raise the question whether ‘the affluent’ can be
seen as a homogenous group in terms of their political
attitudes. Is it sufficient to define them as only those
with high incomes? To shed light on this question, het-
erogeneity among the affluent is analysed by asking two
related questions: Do varieties of affluence matter? Are
the rich in Germany a homogenous group in terms of
their political attitudes? The analysis is based on survey
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),
mainly for the years 2005, 2009, and 2014. While the
available data are not the ideal source with which to
answer the questions posed, it is the best available so
far, providing initial explorative insights into social
outcomes among varieties of affluence in Germany.
The article is structured as follows. Varieties of
Affluence section reviews previous research on the afflu-
ent in Germany, including how they are defined and
assessed and develops a differentiated framework to
account for varieties of affluence as a foundation for the
empirical examination. Affluence and political attitudes
section again consults existing literature in order to de-
rive hypotheses regarding political attitudes among dif-
ferent types of affluence. Methodology section presents
the data and methodology used to test the framework,
the results of which are given in Results section. Finally,
Discussion section discusses the results, followed by a
brief conclusion.
Varieties of Affluence
The affluent3 has been analysed in sociology at least
seminal since the works of Veblen (1899) and Simmel
(1900). Nevertheless, a general lack of research is con-
stantly noted and criticized (e.g. Imbusch, 2003;
Lauterbach and Stro¨ing, 2008; Page, Bartels and
Seawright, 2013). In German sociology, relevant results
mainly come from the intersection of two streams of
literature: the traditional sociology of elites (e.g. Hradil
and Imbusch, 2003; Hartmann, 2013) and a new
sociology of wealth (e.g. Druyen, Lauterbach and
Grundmann, 2008; Bo¨wing-Schmalenbrock, 2012;
Spannagel, 2013; Waitkus and Groh-Samberg, 2018).
Lauterbach and Stro¨ing (2008) provide a systematic
definition of the affluent as a synthesis of the heteroge-
neous existing international literature (Figure 1). The
concept starts off with the assumption of a diversified
stratification of income affluence and, in the next step,
differentiates it further by including wealth. According
to this definition, being wealthy in terms of income
starts at an income level of at least twice the mean or
median.
The relevance of a combined perspective of income
and wealth—and sometimes other dimensions—is
suggested in several recent studies (e.g. Becker, 2003;
Grabka et al., 2007; Druyen, Lauterbach and
Grundmann, 2008; Lauterbach, Druyen and
Grundmann, 2011; Peichl and Pestel, 2011; Bo¨wing-
Schmalenbrock, 2012; Rowlingson and McKay, 2012;
Spannagel, 2013; Skopek, 2015; Keister and Lee, 2017;
Killewald, Pfeffer and Schachner, 2017). To add to these
contributions, a framework is developed in the follow-
ing that includes the origin of wealth in order to analyse
how individuals with different varieties of affluence
vary in terms of social outcomes.
Being ‘rich’ can more accurately be understood
as heterogeneous combinations of different forms of af-
fluence. Being rich shall be defined as based on three
dimensions of economic resources: income, wealth, and
the origin of wealth. Income can be defined as a flow of
economic resources that may be received from various
sources such as labour, return on capital, or government
transfers. Another less-studied and rarer type of income
is windfall income obtained through exogenous sources
such as inheritances or lottery wins. Both of these proc-
esses are not random. There is a good reason to believe
that those who are better off are more likely to receive
inheritances (e.g. Hansen, 2014; Bo¨nke, Corneo and
Westermeier, 2015: pp. 11–13). On the other hand,
there is evidence that lottery participation is skewed to-
wards lower-income groups and the working class
(Beckert and Lutter, 2009, 2012). The reason windfall
income and inheritances are discussed combined is that
they are not distinguishable in the GSOEP over time.
The amount that can be spent or saved regularly
grows with increasing income. Therefore, one could
expect high correlations between income and wealth,
but, especially in (East) Germany, they are far from per-
fect (Peichl and Pestel, 2011). Killewald, Pfeffer and
Schachner (2017: pp. 388–390) also show this for the
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United States and find that wealth is also not completely
related to income in the longer run. The amount of dis-
posable income is highly dependent on household con-
stellation. Therefore, income is usually measured as the
household equivalent income: the overall household in-
come standardized in relation to the number of adults
and children living in it according to the new OECD
equivalence scale (Hagenaars, Vos and Zaidi, 1996).
The second dimension of affluence is wealth that can
be defined as an accumulated stock of different assets
such as real estate, valuable objects, or financial assets.4
Wealth is built up from the different sources of in-
come—depending on individual behaviour such as con-
sumption and saving. Analyses of income and wealth
distributions show that wealth is significantly less equal-
ly distributed than income (Frick, Grabka and Hauser,
2010: pp. 122–124). Depending on the way it is used,
wealth can generate various kinds of income, e.g. divi-
dends from stocks, rent from properties, or increasing
values of valuable objects such as art. Wealth can also
be directly transmitted through gifts or inheritance,
whereas income usually cannot.
Finally, the third dimension is the origin of wealth.
The main underlying idea is whether the accumulated
wealth was mainly self-made or inherited. In economics,
the problem of how to define the share of self-earned
and inherited wealth has long been a matter of discus-
sion (Modigliani, 1986, 1988; Hansen, 2014; Piketty,
Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal, 2014; Bo¨nke, Corneo and
Westermeier, 2015). Modigliani (1986) suggested a
straightforward way to implement the share inherited in
terms of data requirements. The amount of wealth ever
received from inheritances is simply divided by current
net overall wealth.5 This way, the source of wealth can
be analysed as a distinct dimension of wealth.
Based on these three dimensions, an overall frame-
work of varieties of affluence can be constructed. In what
follows, the question of the extent to which these varieties
explain variance in political attitudes will be examined.
For this purpose, the next section derives hypotheses on
political attitudes among different types of affluence.
Affluence and Political Attitudes
In the article ‘The Political Attitudes of Wealth’ published
in 1945, Almond (1945: p. 213) already criticized a sim-
plified generalization in science of those with high
incomes. Today, studies still most often concentrate on
only one or very few dimensions of economic affluence.
For this reason, elements from heterogeneous sources
must be collected to derive hypotheses for groups possess-
ing different varieties of affluence. In what follows, em-
pirical results for political attitudes, interests, partisanship
and similar are collected, which could help us to under-
stand political attitudes of the rich.6 The focus is on
results that might help to derive hypotheses on the main
dependent variable used by the GSOEP: a left–right scale
(LRS) of political attitudes.7
Figure 1. The pyramid of richness. Summary of different definitions of affluence
Source: Lauterbach and Stro¨ing (2008: p. 20; the figure was reproduced and translated by the author).
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Political science suggests that high income should be
related to more right-wing attitudes and less desire for
redistribution (Lipset, 1960: pp. 223–229). When
argued in this way, more income and wealth should lead
to more right-wing views, because people should be
opposed to redistributive policies such as higher income
taxes, wealth taxes, or inheritance taxes (Romer, 1974;
Meltzer and Richard, 1981). This assumption is sup-
ported by empirical research which shows a relationship
between left–right self-placement and attitudes towards
redistribution (Jaeger, 2008). Despite a relevant degree
of noise in this relationship, it still seems plausible to as-
sume that both, income and wealth, should be related to
more right-wing views on average.
However, another relevant question is whether, how,
and why the relationship of wealth on political attitudes
should differ from that of income. There are different
ways in which wealth could affect political attitudes in-
dependent of income. On the one hand, it could be a
spurious relationship reflecting that the same character-
istics, experiences, or attitudes which lead to more
wealth accumulation, conditional on receiving high
income, are also related to political attitudes.8 On the
other hand, there could be a direct effect of self-earned
wealth which might lead to a stronger disapproval of re-
distribution simply because more own, and self-earned
stakes are at risk. As Killewald, Pfeffer and Schachner
(2017: p. 380) put it: ‘Whereas income measures the
flow of financial resources at a particular time, wealth is
a cumulative stock that reflects years of prior circum-
stances and decisions’ (cf. also the discussion in Skopek,
Buchholz and Blossfeld, 2014: pp. 466–470). However,
the scope of this article is not to test such mechanisms.
Instead, the focus here is on one step before that: first, to
examine how different varieties of affluence are related
to political attitudes in the first place. Second, whether
heterogeneous groups among the rich can be identified
empirically in terms of this outcome, and whether one of
the dimensions of affluence alone is sufficient to capture
one (apparent) group of ‘the rich’.
For inheritances and windfall income (IWI), theoret-
ical explanations are not easy to give because they can-
not be distinguished in this work from other types of
income. The presented results must, therefore, be seen as
explorative and further research is needed to understand
how this dimension affects political attitudes. In general,
theoretical predictions of theories of self-interest are
supported by previous empirical studies. Table 1 sum-
marizes the relevant literature.
Studies analysing political attitudes related to wealth
show strong support for more right-wing views—al-
though relevant studies are only a few. For Germany,
the support for the CDU is strongly related to higher
positions in the distribution of net overall wealth (Bach
and Grabka, 2013). Analysing views on different poli-
cies, Page, Bartels and Seawright (2013) report more
conservative views of the wealthy in the United States.
They also find evidence that the relationship might be
very strong for extremely large wealth. Therefore, the
following hypotheses are drawn:
H1: The possession of wealth is related to an identifica-
tion as right-wing.
H1a: The possession of more wealth is associated with
more right-wing attitudes among the non-rich.
H1b: The possession of more wealth is associated with
more right-wing attitudes among the rich.
H1c: Those with very large wealth are more to the right
than other groups among the rich.
The picture for income is a bit more ambivalent. Bach
and Grabka (2013) report that support for the CDU and
FDP increases with increasing household equivalent in-
come. The relationship is weaker compared with wealth,
however. Different studies for the United States found that
those with high incomes are more conservative in econom-
ic terms but more liberal in social terms; that is, in topics
such as gay rights or abortion (Gilens, 2009; Page and
Hennessy, 2010; Gilens, 2012). Others find only slight dif-
ferences (Ura and Ellis, 2008), or even none at all (Soroka
and Wlezien, 2008). The geographical region also seems
to matter and might mediate the opinions of the wealthy
(Flavin, 2011). One could, therefore, expect that high in-
come is related to more ‘right-wing’ political attitudes at
least in terms of economic and redistribution topics.
Because of the reported socially liberal orientation of high-
income earners, the effect is expected to be smaller than
that of wealth. This is also in line with recent findings by
Piketty (2018) for the United States, France, and United
Kingdom. The following hypotheses shall be tested:
H2: High income is related to an identification as
right-wing.
H2a: High income is related to an identification as
right-wing for the non-rich.
H2b: High income is related to an identification as
right-wing among the rich.
H2c: The effect of income on being right-wing is weaker
than the effect of wealth.
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Table 1. Empirical results on political attitudes, views, preferences, and partisanship for dimensions of affluence








Germany Percentiles and deciles of
net overall wealth
Yes German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP); years 2009–2011; sam-
ple: aged 18þ, German citizens.
Spannagel (2013) Germany 150 per cent and 200
per cent of median
income
No GSOEP; Year 2004
Page, Bartels and
Seawright (2013)
United States Top 1 per cent of net over-
all wealth/economic elite
Yes ‘High-level executives of fairly large
firms’; only from Chicago area;
roughly from top 1 per cent of




United States Top 1 per cent of ‘wealth’
distribution
No Small sample (n ¼ 43) of wealthy
Americans from the Chicago area;
assessed in 2011
Piketty (2018) France, United States,
United Kingdom
Wealth percentiles up to
top 1 per cent
Yes American National Election Studies,
years 1948–2016; National Exit
Polls, 1972–2016; British Election
Study, 1963–2017; Fondation





Germany Percentiles and deciles of
household equivalence
income
Yes GSOEP; years 2009–2011; sample:
aged 18þ, German citizens
Page and Hennessy
(2010)
United States Top 3-4 per cent of
‘income’ earners
Ambivalent US General Social Survey (GSS); years
1977, 1978, and 1980; n ¼ 132
Giger, Rosset and
Bernauer (2012)




Top 40 per cent of national
‘income’ distribution
Yes Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems (CSES); years 2002–2006
Soroka and Wlezien
(2008)
United States Top 30 per cent of
‘income’17
No GSS; 24 years between 1973 and
2004.
Gilens (2009) United States Different top shares of
‘income’
Yes GSS; 24 years between 1973 and
2004.
Gilens (2012) United States Ca. top 20 per cent of
income earners;
Ambivalent 1981–2002; different samples of over
1,700 questions on single policies
from several surveys for the United
States
data extrapolated statistic-
ally to describe top 10
per cent
Ura and Ellis (2008) United States Top quartile of ‘income’
distribution
Yes GSS; 1974–2004
Pryor (2015) United States Top 10 per cent of house-
hold equivalence income
No GSS; years 1982–2010; respondents
aged 21–80.
Flavin (2011) United States Non-equivalent household
income of US$75,000 or
greater
No National Annenberg Election Surveys
(NAES); years 2002 and 2004; n
130,000
Piketty (2018) France, United States,
United Kingdom
Income percentiles up to
top 1 per cent
Yes American National Election Studies,
years 1948–2016; National Exit
Polls, 1972–2016; British Election
(continued)
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As another frequently mentioned group among the
rich, an ‘economic elite’ is of interest to a long tradition
of elite sociology. In traditional elite studies, wealth and
economic resources are often related to a group of top
executive managers as wealthy group, and there is a gen-
eral interest and previous research on their political atti-
tudes (e.g. Galonska, 2012; Allmendinger et al., 2013;
Hartmann, 2013; Hecht, 2017). Therefore, an economic
elite is included in the analysis. Results from the soci-
ology of elites can be drawn on here when assuming that
the ‘economic elite’ are top-managers with especially
high incomes. They could be conceived as a special sub-
group of those with high incomes: high-performing, top-
income earners with high-responsibility positions. Their
political attitudes might be distinct to other high-income
earners or wealth holders. Galonska (2012) finds strong
support for the CDU and FDP among this group and far
right-wing political self-classification in comparison to
other groups. Hartmann (2013) shows findings from
elite interviews in which economic elites present argu-
ably conservative views on social inequality. When look-
ing at the LRS of the underlying data (Allmendinger
et al., 2013; cf. Table 1), a self-classification of 5.9 on
the LRS is found among this group. In sum, elite groups
can be expected to deviate to the right from other groups
possessing varieties of affluence:
H3: Being a member of the economic elite is related to
an identification as right-wing among the rich.
The last relevant dimension is origin of wealth, or
IWI. For Germany, a study on behalf of Deutsche Bank
interviewed different heirs and future bequeathers as
part of an overall representative sample (Blumenthal
and Ho¨rter, 2015). Those who had already inherited
agreed most with opinions paraphrasing that inheritan-
ces above EUR 1 million should be taxed higher and
that current inheritance law reproduces social inequal-
ity. One could interpret these findings as an indicator
for more pro-redistributive and, therefore, left opinions
among this group.
The literature analysing the effect of lottery wins in
the US and the UK points in a different direction. There
is some evidence that the amount won in a lottery is
related to more conservative views and partisanship in
Table 1. (Continued)






nationale des sciences politiques,
1958–2017
Economic elite
Hartmann (2013) Germany Elite positions in major
corporations
Yes German Institute for Economic
Research (DIW) Elite study;
n ¼ 102; assessed in 2011
Galonska (2012) Germany Elite positions in high-rev-
enue corporations and
trade associations
Yes Identification and sampling from dif-
ferent elite positions; 1968–1995
Allmendinger et al.
(2013)
Germany Elite positions in major
corporations
Yes DIW Elite study; n ¼ 102; assessed in
2011
Inheritance and windfall income
Blumenthal and
Ho¨rter (2015)
Germany Bequeather and heirs com-
pared with the general
public
No Representative of the German
population aged 16þ; n ¼ 1.661
participants; n ¼ 554 of respond-
ents had already inherited
Peterson (2016) United States Those who played and won
the lottery




United States Those who played and won
the lottery and responded
to a telephone interview
No 342 lottery winners 1983–2000
Powdthavee and
Oswald (2014)
United Kingdom Those who won the lottery
and participated in the
BHPS
Yes British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS); n ¼ 9,003; aged
21þ; 1996–2010.
Notes: ‘Main result: conservative?’ summarizes whether the results could be interpreted as evidence that the respective dimension of affluence is related to holding
more ‘conservative’ views.
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the United Kingdom and support for the Republican
party in the United States (Powdthavee and Oswald,
2014; Peterson, 2016). Doherty, Gerber and Green
(2006) find no effect of winning the lottery on opinions
on social inequality, but opinions on inheritance taxes
change after winning. These results again give evidence
that inheritance and other windfall income might not be
easily comparable. Not only that the groups of heirs and
lottery winners are structurally very different but also
the direct effects of receiving an inheritance or a lottery
win might be incomparable. For example, inheritances
are often planned by bequeathers and expected by pro-
spective heirs which might influence attitudes, e.g. to-
wards inheritance taxes before and after inheriting.
However—over time—the two sources of income are
not distinguished in the GSOEP (cf. Methodology sec-
tion). To account for this, three different hypotheses are
derived here. First, the absolute amount of windfall in-
come is assumed to be related to more conservative
views, following the lottery studies.
H4a: Having received larger amounts of windfall in-
come is related to identifying as right-wing among
the non-rich.
H4b: Having received larger amounts of windfall income
is related to identifying as right-wing among the rich.
The second follows the indication from the Deutsche
Bank inheritance survey:
H4c: Those who received any amount of inheritances or
other windfall income are more left compared to
the overall average.
These hypotheses, derived from various pieces of het-
erogeneous extant literature, will be analysed mainly
using three waves of the GSOEP in the following.
Methodology
This section presents the data and variables, the sample,
and the research design. The analysis is based on the
GSOEP, an annual panel assessment with more than
12,000 German households and 20,000 respondents.
Three features of the GSOEP concerning economic
affluence are especially advantageous for this work.
First, in addition to income, wealth is also assessed in
some years (Frick, Grabka and Marcus, 2013). Second,
high-income households were oversampled from 2002
onwards, which increases statistical power for this
group (Frick et al., 2007). Finally, GSOEP assesses inher-
itances in 2001 (Rosenblatt, 2002: p. 10) and windfall
income after that. On top of the detailed assessment of
economic affluence, there are also relevant questions on
political views. Among others, the LRS was assessed in
some years, which is used as a dependent variable here.
It is important to mention that, as common in quan-
titative survey research, measurement error is also a
problem in the GSOEP. Specifically, the most important
independent variables of income and wealth are a matter
of this problem. Respondents may not answer, or misre-
port, e.g. due to matters of cognitive limitations, privacy
concerns or social desirability (Schra¨pler, 2002).
Because of these problems, a careful inquiry as well as
elaborate editing and imputation was performed and
validation with corresponding information from nation-
al balance sheets gives confidence in the data (e.g. Frick,
Grabka and Hauser, 2010; Grabka, Marcus and
Sierminska, 2013: pp. 4–5; Grabka and Westermeier,
2015). There is some evidence indicating that measure-
ment error in the GSOEP might be higher for income
than for wealth, possibly because it is considered as
more private than wealth as studied and discussed
in Riphahn and Serfling (2005: pp. 530–534).
Measurement error among the independent variables
might attenuate regression coefficients which should be
kept in mind for the analysis (Fox, 2011: pp. 112–115).
Operationalization and Sample
The classical LRS is assessed as an 11-point scale.
Respondents are asked to position themselves from 0
(far left) to 10 (far right) (TNS Infratest
Sozialforschung, 2005: p. 32). Despite criticism of this
instrument (Weber and Saris, 2015; Bauer et al., 2017;
Otjes, 2018), it can be useful to make international com-
parisons (e.g. Giger, Rosset and Bernauer, 2012) and
offers a well-known one-dimensional measure of polit-
ical attitudes. Varieties of affluence are relevant in other
national contexts as well. It, therefore, makes sense not
to rely on a measure such as partisanship that is presum-
ably even more dependent on the national context.
Unfortunately, wealth was assessed only in 2002,
2007, and 2012, whereas the LRS was assessed in 2005,
2009, and 2014. The years that included the LRS scale
are analysed in this article and wealth values are taken
from the previous assessment; for example, wealth
assessed in 2002 is used to predict the LRS in 2005.
As the main independent variables, three dimensions
of affluence are suggested in Varieties of Affluence sec-
tion: income, wealth, and origin of wealth. For each of
them, one central measure is chosen from which other
measures are derived for the analysis. For income, the
pre-government household equivalence income is the
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central measure of choice. It is defined as ‘the combined
income before taxes and government transfers of all
individuals in the household 16 years of age and older’
(Grabka, 2014: p. 41) and weighted with the OECD
equivalence scale (as proposed by Hagenaars, Vos and
Zaidi, 1996; cf. Varieties of Affluence section).9 The
measure is standardized for the respective year.10
Measures for level of income richness correspond to
double and triple the sample mean. The double mean in-
come in 2014, for example, is EUR 53,252 per year.
The central measure chosen for wealth is net overall
household wealth. This measure is the sum of all kinds
of wealth in a household net of debts. In contrast to in-
come, wealth is not standardized per capita.11 Wealth is
assessed as self-estimated market value of different
assets such as real estate, valuables, or financial assets.
Cars and tangible and financial assets of less than EUR
2,500, and consumer debts of less than EUR 2,500
are excluded (Frick, Grabka and Sierminska, 2007:
pp. 2–3). Assets are totalled and all debts subtracted to
calculate net overall wealth. The value is calculated as
the mean of the provided multiple imputations for every
case (Frick, Grabka and Marcus, 2013). Wealth is
used standardized to the mean for each year. Level of
wealthiness is introduced as a categorical variable distin-
guishing between comparable categories suggested
in the literature: the affluent with wealth of more than
EUR 500,000, and HNWI with wealth of more than
EUR 1,000,000.12 There are few cases involving more
than EUR 30,000,000 of wealth in the SOEP, therefore,
only the first two categories are used and the HNWI cat-
egory is top-coded.
Finally, the origin of wealth is measured by referring
to IWI, which includes inheritances, gifts, and other
windfall income such as lottery wins. The reason for this
combined perspective is solely data restriction (cf.
Varieties of Affluence section). Two measures are used
for IWI. The first is the standardized absolute amount of
IWI received. It is composed of two items: inheritances
until 2001 and yearly windfall income received after
that. Although types of inheritances were assessed, the
exact values per type are unknown. This makes it hard
to capitalize them in relation to the real value in the year
they were received. Therefore, the total inherited value
is used without accounting for value changes, for ex-
ample, through inflation or capital returns.13 From
2001 onwards, all windfall income is assessed annually.
Both amounts are added up until the year of analysis.
Like the other wealth and income measures, also IWI is
standardized for the respective year. The second meas-
ure is categories of the absolute amount of IWI received.
In analogy to the wealth categories, thresholds are
below and above 500,000e of IWI.
The economic elite is defined as follows: Those who
are employees with comprehensive executive tasks are
taken as a basis. From this group, those who are add-
itionally in the top 1 per cent of individual labour in-
come in each year are coded as economic elite. As an
example, the top 1 per cent of labour income in the sam-
ple begins at EUR 112,713 in 2014. Only 12 per cent of
this subgroup is female.
Relevant confounding variables are chosen informed
by the literature on political attitudes and partisanship
in Germany (e.g. Zuckerman and Kroh, 2006).
The main interest is in the direct relationship between
varieties of affluence and political attitudes, net of
other relevant influences. Therefore, other confounding
variables relevant for political attitudes are controlled
for. A variation of the standard Erikson -Goldthorpe -
Portocarero (EGP) class scheme (Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 1993) is used in its four-class version (Breen,
2009) and a category for the unemployed is added.14
Education is based on the 1997 International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED) scheme, aggregated
to low, medium, and high education (Eurostat, 2011).
Religion was assessed in the years 2003, 2007, 2011, and
2015. Confession for the years of analysis is taken from
the closest assessments. Migration background is an indi-
cator that includes both direct and indirect migration
background. Other control variables are interested in pol-
itics, age, age2, self-employment, federal state, gender,
marriage status, and wave as a time dummy.15
The analyses are based on two pooled unbalanced
samples with a total of 47,978 cases from the GSOEP,
covering the years 2005, 2009, and 2014. The compos-
ition of the samples is illustrated in Table 2. The analy-
ses are, therefore, conditional on being rich or not being
rich. A joint analysis is presented in the Supplementary
material.
The dependent and all independent variables and
their descriptive summary statistics for the sample are
displayed in Table 3. The descriptive statistics show that
some of the relevant categories are small. This is especial-
ly the case for large IWI, and to a lesser extent for wealth.
This needs to be kept in mind when evaluating the results.
Correlations displayed in Table 4 demonstrate that
interpretation of the continuous variables should not be
affected by strong multicollinearity, and the correlation
between income and wealth is also relatively low.
Research Design
The research strategy is made up of two steps. The first
is to describe how different dimensions of affluence are
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related to political attitudes in the two samples: the non-
rich and the rich. Second, heterogeneity of political atti-
tudes among those who can be considered ‘rich’ in terms
of income or wealth will be analysed. To analyse hetero-
geneity, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models
with robust standard errors are used to estimate differ-
ences between the dimensions of affluence for the whole
sample, while controlling for confounding factors. For
wealth, the mean of the multiple imputed wealth values
provided by the DIW is used, without adjusting models
for multiple imputations in the main analysis but as a ro-
bustness check in the Supplementary material.
Results
The hypotheses drawn in Affluence and political atti-
tudes section are tested with the results of the OLS
(Table 5). To avoid multicollinearity, continuous and
categorical independent variables are analysed in differ-
ent models. Results for the non-rich sample (M1–M6)
are discussed first, and for the rich (M7–M13) second.
Killewald, Pfeffer and Schachner (2017: p. 382) suggest
that the consequences of wealth may vary across its dis-
tribution. To account for this, interaction terms were
included for wealth, income, and between to the two, to
describe the relationships in the samples as exhaustive as
possible. Marginal effect plots are presented as sug-
gested by Berry, Golder and Milton (2012) to allow
their appropriate interpretation.
Among the clearest results is support for Hypotheses
H1a. Wealth seems to be an important predictor for
more right self-classification in both samples. This result
persists with or without controlling for confounding var-
iables. Model M2 suggests that the possession of one
standard deviation (SD) additional wealth is related to
an increase of self-classification on the LRS of 0.62 for
the non-rich.
However, there is evidence for non-linearity of the ef-
fect of wealth in both samples. For the non-rich, the con-
ditional effect of wealth on wealth increases (Figure 2b).
That is, the relationship becomes even stronger for high
levels of wealth. In contrast to this, the effect of wealth
seems to decrease with increased wealth in the rich sam-
ple (Figure 3b). For both samples, the coefficient of
wealth is estimated to be larger than zero with 95 per
cent for a wide range of observed wealth values. There is
one exception, though, in both cases: the effect of wealth
conditional on income is not distinguishable from zero
anymore if income is far above the mean. That is, if in-
come is ca. 1 SD above the mean for the non-rich
(Figure 2c), or ca. 15 for the rich (Figure 3c), wealth
does not show a significant effect anymore. However,
this finding could also be due to the low number of cases
with very large income or wealth. Overall, wealth is
strongly related to right-wing self-classification but the
relationship is non-linear and is conditional on being
rich or not, and on the position in the wealth and in-
come distribution.
For income, results are more ambivalent. For the
non-rich sample, the effect of income without control-
ling for confounding variables seems to be related to
slightly, though significantly, more left-wing self-classifi-
cation. However, controlling for confounding variables,
neither a significant unconditional effect of income can
be found (M2), nor significant conditional effects for
any observed position in the income distribution
(Figure 2a). Therefore, hypothesis H2a cannot be sup-
ported because income alone does not seem to have an
effect for the non-rich. For the rich sample this is
Table 2. Sample compositions
Cases Per cent
Sample 1: The non-rich





Missing values in any of the
variables used
7,528 10.9
Sample 2: Those whose wealth is
>500k e wealth
6,618 9.6
OR whose income is >200
per cent of the mean





Sample 2: The rich





Missing values in any of the
variables used
7,528 10.9
Sample 1: Those whose wealth is
<500k e wealth
41,360 59.9
AND whose income is <200
per cent of the mean

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































/esr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/esr/jcz051/5585947 by guest on 14 O
ctober 2019
different. First of all, income seems to be related to
right-wing self-classification (M2). There is evidence for
a decreasing marginal effect for higher levels of income
(Figure 3a). Further support is given by the finding that
those with at least 300 per cent mean income are signifi-
cantly more right than those who are not income rich.
Hypothesis H2b, therefore, also finds support—though
only from 300 per cent of the mean upwards.
When it comes to IWI, results are somewhat ambiva-
lent again. The first finding is that, for the non-rich,
there seems to be a significant negative effect of the ab-
solute amount of IWI received. But, on closer inspection,
this can easily be challenged. First of all, there is no such
effect for the rich. Second, when excluding influential
cases (Supplementary material A4) this effect does not
persist and it can, furthermore, only be reproduced for
two of the three waves (Supplementary material A5).
Hypothesis H4a must, therefore, be rejected. There is
some indication, however, that receiving windfall in-
come or inheritances is related to more left self-
classification. Compared with those who did not receive
any IWI, those who received between zero and EUR
500,000 IWI are slightly less conservative. This result
seems more robust, at least in terms of influential data,
and supports hypothesis H4c. Taking into account the
discussed problems of the measure, there is some indica-
tion that IWI might matter but better data are necessary
to make more robust claims.
The second step of the analysis is to look closer for
heterogeneity among the rich only: those with either an
income of at least 200 per cent of mean income or at
least EUR 500,000 of wealth. For this group as well, 1
SD of increase in wealth is related to a significant in-
crease in right-wing self-classification in all models, M7
to M12. Again, the effect is conditional on the position
in the wealth and income distribution. When income is
equal to the mean, the effect of wealth is estimated to be
larger than zero for the whole observed range
(Figure 3b). However, with increased income above the
mean, the conditional effect of wealth decreases to zero
and even significantly negative—although the number of
cases is too low in the range of the negative effect to
make any robust claims (Figure 3c). Wealth still seems
to be among the most important and persistent predic-
tors for right LRS identification and H1b can, therefore,
be supported. Though, the effect is more equal to that of
income for the rich, and its strength also depends on in-
come. Compared with those with only high incomes,
respondents with wealth of more than EUR 500,000
and EUR 1,000,000 seem to be significantly more con-
servative than the average rich person in the sample, and
hypothesis H1c thus finds good support.
Total income shows a significant effect in all models
for the rich. In addition, those with at least 300 per cent
of the mean are significantly more conservative than
those with income of 200 per cent of the mean or less.
This result contributes to the image that among the rich,
those with only 200 per cent of mean income or less are
the least conservative group. Other evidence suggests
that higher income of at least 300 per cent of the mean
is associated with more conservative views. Therefore,
hypothesis H2b can be supported.
Hypothesis H2c, if wealth has a stronger effect than
income, is not trivial to judge. On the one hand, the un-
conditional coefficients for wealth in models (M7) and
(M8) are larger than those for income. On the other
hand, the conditional marginal effect for income when
possessing around the mean of wealth (Figure 3a) is esti-
mated larger, than that of wealth (Figure 3b), though
not significantly larger at the 0.05 level. Evaluating the
conditional effects overall, the effect clearly does show
an effect besides income and this effect seems signifi-
cantly larger than zero for the observed high levels of
wealth. But it also depends on income and when income
Table 4. Correlations of continuous variables separated by sample
Std. income Std. wealth Std. IWI Political interest
The non-rich The rich The non-rich The rich The non-rich The rich The non-rich The rich
Std. income 1.00*** 1.00***
Std. wealth 0.22*** 0.17*** 1.00*** 1.00***
Std. IWI 0.05*** 0.04* 0.13*** 0.09*** 1.00*** 1.00***
Political interest 0.01** 0.05*** 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.03* 1.00*** 1.00***
Age 0.45*** 0.00 0.30*** 0.16*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.22*** 0.23***
Notes: Std. income ¼ pre-government household equivalent income standardized for each year; Std. wealth ¼ net overall wealth standardized for each year; Std.
IWI ¼ sum of inheritances and windfall income standardized for each year.
*P<0.05, **P< 0.01, ***P< 0.00.
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is very high, wealth does not show a significant effect
anymore. Yet, the non-continuous measures indicate
that wealth might overall be more strongly correlated to
right self-placement. H2c, therefore, finds support espe-
cially for the non-rich, where wealth is clearly more im-
portant than income. For the rich, coefficients of wealth
seem more equal to those of income—but together with
the evidence of the high wealth categories, H2c finds
support. This finding is also discussed further in the next
section.
The effect of IWI shows a similar pattern for the rich
as for the non-rich. Receiving IWI at all seems to make a
difference, whereas its amount does not. The results for
IWI, therefore, only allow to make one claim which is
that the origin of wealth seems to matter. However, the
directions, mechanisms, and strengths of effects need to
be analysed with more elaborated data sources on this
matter. Especially a differentiation between inheritances
and other windfall income would enable to understand
better whether only one of the two or both matter and
in what way exactly.
Finally, the economic elite was tested here as a poten-
tial distinct group among the rich. Results suggest that
this group is far more conservative than the average
among the rich, and hypothesis H3 finds support for this
sample. In fact, coefficients are comparably large as
those for being wealthy with at least EUR 500,000.
All of the presented results, except when stated
otherwise, are robust to the exclusion of influential
data, separate analysis for the individual waves, as well
as adjusted models for multiply imputed wealth data, as
discussed and presented in the Supplementary mater-




Figure 2.Modelled interactions in models M3 (a), M4 (b), and M5 (c)
Note: Marginal effect plots for the modelled interactions in M3 (a), M4 (b), and M5 (c), including 95% confidence interval as suggested by Berry et al.
[2012; see also Golder (n.d.) for the STATA code]. The figures show the marginal effect of a change of 1 SD of income or wealth (left axes) conditional, re-
spectively, on the position in the income or wealth distribution as SDs from the mean (bottom axes). The graphs also include the sample distribution of
the variable conditioned on as histogram in light grey (right axes) and scatter (dark grey lines above bottom axes). The horizontal line in the middle
denotes a marginal effect of zero. When the confidence interval includes this line, the effect is not statistically significantly different from zero at the 95%
confidence level.
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Discussion
Two related questions are discussed in this section in
light of the results: Do varieties of affluence matter for
the explanation of social outcomes? Are the rich homo-
genous in terms of their political attitudes?
The first question can be answered with a definitive
yes, at least for political attitudes. This is not necessarily
a surprising outcome and the only reason this differenti-
ation has not been made so far is probably due to lack of
relevant data. However, in the literature, discussions too
often include implicit or explicit generalizations from in-
come richness to wealthiness. Varieties of affluence can
make a difference for social outcomes, as demonstrated
here for political attitudes. It is especially remarkable
that income, the dimension most often referred to, seems
to have the smallest impact on political attitudes. This is
even more striking when compared with the impact of
wealth. Results suggest that the perspective of varieties
of affluence could also add to other fields of sociology,
such as the study of context effects (e.g. Brooks-Gunn
et al., 1993), intergenerational transmission of advan-
tage (e.g. Pfeffer, 2011; Pfeffer and Schoeni, 2016),




Figure 3.Modelled interactions in models M9 (a), M10 (b), and M11 (c)
Note: Marginal effect plots for the modelled interactions in M9 (a), M10 (b), and M11 (c) including 95% confidence interval as suggested by Berry et al.
[2012; see also Golder (n.d.) for the STATA code]. The figures show the marginal effect of a change of one standard deviation of income or wealth (left
axes) conditional, respectively, on the position in the income or wealth distribution as standard deviations from the mean (bottom axes). The graphs also
include the sample distribution of the variable conditioned on as histogram in light grey (right axes) and scatter (dark grey lines above bottom axes). The
horizontal line in the middle denotes a marginal effect of zero. When the confidence interval includes this line, the effect is not statistically significantly
different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
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Are the rich homogenous in terms of their political
attitudes? When looking at the data available for
Germany today, a tendency can be identified, but more
data are necessary to understand what is going on in the
top categories. Figure 4 shows comparisons between
those who are not rich and those with different combi-
nations of wealth and income. Most of the variations on
the 0–10 point LRS occur between 4.5 and 6, but there
are some significant differences. Most of the relevant
variation is taking place between owning wealth or not.
It also seems that receiving more than 300 per cent of
mean income adds to the effect of being wealthy, though
not perfectly. A second finding is that, according to the
analysed data, no justifiable assertion can be made
about those who own more than EUR 1 million of
wealth. The large level of uncertainty within this group
might well be due to the relatively small sample sizes (cf.
Table 3), or it might indicate more heterogeneous views.
However, looking at top wealth holders in the sample
may give a preview of the potential rewards of collecting
more data on those with very high wealth.
The pattern in Figure 5 is in line with similar findings
that Page, Bartels and Seawright (2013: pp. 64–65) re-
port for the United States: there is some evidence that
very immense wealth might be related to far more con-
servative views. As in the US study, sample sizes here are
very small. The GSOEP data comprise only 17
households with more than EUR 5 million. Wealth
records of these respondents vary between EUR 5.1 and
50.5 million and are original records, not imputed statis-
tically. It is remarkable that those few individuals with
by far the highest wealth in the SOEP position them-
selves far right on the LRS—one even at 10. If hetero-
geneity among the rich can be described with more
certainty based on more extensive data, then this is, of
course, only the first step in determining the causal
mechanisms for the differences. Several causes are plaus-
ible that would have to be determined by future re-
search. In any case, they will surely be dependent on
different forms of affluence.
Heterogeneity of political attitudes and opinions
might be underestimated when looking at income only.
This interpretation finds some support when inspecting
results from existing studies in political science. In many
studies comparing the opinions of those with high
incomes and lower-income groups, variation within the
highest income group seems to be largest, as indicated
by standard deviations or standard errors (e.g. Soroka
and Wlezien, 2008: p. 320; Flavin, 2011: p. 42; Peters
and Ensink, 2015: p. 583; Bartels, 2016: p. 262). While
some authors explicitly address this and either do not
find systematically different within-income-group vari-
ation (Gilens, 2012: pp. 91–92), or provide an alterna-
tive explanation (Ura and Ellis, 2008: p. 789), this fact
Figure 4. Estimates for wealth and income
Notes: Predicted means and 95% confidence intervals for different combinations of wealthiness and income richness when controlling for all confound-
ers. Differences are estimated based for both samples combined.
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might indicate that there is more heterogeneity among
the affluent than in the compared groups—especially
when only measured as highest income tertile, quintile,
or decile. However, it might also be due to smaller sam-
ple sizes. To clarify this, possible heterogeneity among
the rich should be given more attention in future studies.
Overall, the results presented here indicate that there
is considerable heterogeneity among different groups.
This insight and the consciousness about it might be
helpful in identifying causal mechanisms for how polit-
ical phenomena involving the rich work. For example, if
social scientific research wants to explain why ‘the rich’
are better represented than other social groups as sug-
gested by responsiveness bias research (Gilens, 2012;
Bartels, 2016), it has to identify mechanisms which ac-
count for this heterogeneity. Namely, which group is
assumed to be better represented than those with lower
incomes or wealth? Comparing political attitudes be-
tween potentially relevant groups suggests that these
attitudes differ, as presented in Figure 6.
Overall, social scientific research can only benefit
from more interest in varieties of affluence. Opinions of
distinct groups among the affluent on more gradual
measures such as opinions on individual policies could
be especially beneficial. After all, as Almond (1945:
p. 213) put it, ‘the existence of deviational groups of
this type and size plays havoc with any simple effort to
account for the political attitudes of wealth, or for that
matter, of any economic and social group’. With
increasing availability of data accounting for this var-
iety, his claim is more relevant than ever today.
Conclusion
This article discussed definitions of being rich in relation
to varieties of affluence such as income, wealth, and ori-
gin of wealth, proxied by IWI. Varieties of Affluence
section developed a framework with which to analyse
differences in social outcomes. Affluence and political
attitudes section derived hypotheses on political
attitudes for different dimensions of affluence.
Methodology section and Results section applied the
varieties of affluence perspective to data from the
GSOEP by analysing heterogeneity in terms of political
attitudes for different groups among the rich. Finally,
Discussion section discussed the results in light of rele-
vant open questions.
The main finding is that wealth—and not income—
seems to be the dominant dimension for political atti-
tudes among the rich. There are also indications that
Figure 5. Political attitudes of top wealth holders in the samples
Notes: Three regression lines are presented based on predictions from Model M12. The first is for < EUR 1 million net overall wealth, shown below the
solid horizontal line. The second is for respondents with between EUR 1 and 5 million (shown by crosses; n ¼ 235 of which 195 distinct individuals from
189 distinct households). The third is for records with the highest wealth in the sample of more than EUR 5 million (shown by triangles; n ¼ 26 of which
19 distinct individuals from 17 distinct households).
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very large fortunes might be associated with strongly con-
servative views. Similarly, IWI seems to be a potentially
relevant dimension, which should be analysed further
with more data on the very wealthy and those who inherit
large sums of wealth. Finally, qualitatively disparate
groups could be identified that exhibit significantly het-
erogeneous political attitudes. This insight sheds light on
the relevance of heterogeneity among the rich.
Several shortcomings of this study could not be over-
come due to the available data. First, the sample is not
representative because weights for the combination of
subsamples used are so far not provided. Also, sample
sizes of the very wealthy and inheritors of large wealth
are still very small. This is because, in contrast to in-
come, those with high wealth are not oversampled in the
data. In addition, longitudinal wealth data could lead to
more certain assertions about mechanisms and conse-
quences related to wealth possession. The fact that only
wealth data assessed 2–3 years before the dependent
variable was available is unfortunate and introduces
some inevitable bias to the results. In addition to that,
measurement bias of wealth and income might be evi-
dent which possibly attenuated the found effects.
Overall, the available data were exploited as the best
source available today. However, the data basis must be
extended to allow for results that are more than an ini-
tial exploration.
Today, when many indicators point towards an increas-
ing concentration of wealth, income, and inheritances,
there is a good reason to devote more attention to different
kinds of economic affluence and understand the variance
between individuals and groups holding such economically
privileged positions in our societies. As far as this is pos-
sible, integrating them into standardized surveys assessing
all aspects of life would enable us to finally analyse the rich
with representative, comparable data, as it is done for al-
most all other members of society already. Existing studies
on the very wealthy (e.g. Lauterbach et al., 2016) could be
built upon and ideally integrated into standard large-scale
panel surveys, as is by now planned for one of the next
GSOEP releases. In addition, more creative and heteroge-
neous measures and methods will be necessary to under-
stand how varieties of affluence are obtained and
maintained, and how they influence individuals, their lives,
and therefore, society as a whole in the long run.
Notes
1 See King (2017) for a review of the critiques of
Piketty’s claim.
2 In what way, and how much, varieties of affluence
matter will, therefore, strongly depend on the
studied outcome. Political attitudes are chosen
as one example here; however, other outcomes
Figure 6. Political attitudes of different groups among the rich
Note: Based on M13. Predicted LRS means and 95% confidence intervals are displayed.






/esr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/esr/jcz051/5585947 by guest on 14 O
ctober 2019
might be related to them in different direct or
indirect ways.
3 For now, the term affluent is used—in accordance
with most of the existing literature—as being
affluent in one of two dimensions: income or
wealth. Terms such as affluent, wealthy, and rich
are, therefore, used interchangeably. A more differ-
entiated definition is given in Varieties of Affluence
section.
4 The inclusion of pension claims is also often sug-
gested and discussed. It is disregarded in this article
because of its main interest in the top group in
terms of different dimensions of financial wealth
in Germany. However, it might be reasonable to
include pension claims, e.g. for cross-country
comparisons.
5 The reason capitalization is disregarded here is data
restriction (cf. Operationalization and sample
section).
6 Political attitudes, orientation, and right- and left-
wing orientations are used interchangeably in this
article.
7 For a discussion of the meaning of the LRS for
Germany see Fuhse (2004). To analyse the avail-
able empirical results about the affluent, it is
assumed that the Free Democrats (FDP) and
Christian Democrats (CDU) are seen as right from
the centre. This is also in line with robust findings
from voter surveys, e.g. reported by Sto¨ss (1997) or
Urban Pappi, Kurella and Bra¨uninger (2016).
Results from the United States referring to liberal
and conservative are regarded as roughly equivalent
to the left-right distinction. In recent years, there
seems to be an overall shift towards the left that is
possibly due to right-wing populist movements
(Infratest dimap, 2015; Piketty, 2018). Therefore,
the year of inquiry is included as confounder in the
analysis.
8 See, for example, Hecht (2017) for a description of
different potential mechanisms relevant for polit-
ical attitudes, and heterogeneous groups among the
group of top income earners in London.
9 There are two reasons why income is used before
government transfers and taxes. The first is that the
absolute amount of pre-government income entails
the amount of tax relevant income which might be
relevant for political attitudes. Second, receiving
high pre-government income implies that one is
not dependent on government transfers. This
might influence political attitudes, e.g. towards
redistribution.
10 Taking the example of wealth this means:




Where Z is the standardized transformation used in
the analyses, Xy is the originally observed value of
wealth in year y, X

y is mean wealth in that respect-
ive year (i.e. the year in which the variable was
assessed), and rXy is the standard deviation of
wealth in year y. Standardization was performed
for the rich and the non-rich combined in each year
and not separately for each sample.
11 The first reason for this is that wealth thresholds
are defined in absolute terms. Second, using overall
as well as non-capitalized wealth, the stakes for
exceeding the thresholds are lowered which is pref-
erable here because sample sizes are very limited in
the first place. However, some cases might not be
considered rich in terms of wealth when applying a
household standardized measure.
12 However, in contrast to the literature, net overall
wealth is used here instead of available net financial
capital which means stakes for being rich in terms
of wealth are lowered significantly. The used cate-
gories simply overtake descriptive definitions often
used in the literature. This shall not imply, how-
ever, that they have a substantial sociological
meaning. They are rather used here as a starting
point to identify heterogeneous groups and to see
whether they, in fact, do empirically identify dis-
tinct groups in terms of political attitudes. This is
also why the thresholds in dollars are simply used
in euros in the analysis. For a discussion of a more
substantial definition see, for example, Fessler and
Schu¨rz (2017).
13 A more detailed presentation of the measure and a
summary of its shortcomings is provided in the
Supplementary material A1.
14 Households are assigned according to the occupa-
tion of its head as suggested by Goldthorpe (1983)
and the retired are assigned according to their last
occupation.
15 A full table of all included variables and descriptive
statistics can be found in the Supplementary mater-
ial A2.
16 In addition, the main results do not change when
bootstrapping percentile standard errors or when
excluding confounders which could be suspect to
introduce post-treatment bias (such as arguably
class or political interest) are excluded (not
reported).
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17 Unfortunately, for most of the studies based on the
GSS, it is not clear whether family income or person-
al income is used. Both were assessed in the GSS
(Hout, 2004); most often, the articles do not specify.
There are some implicit remarks that suggest individ-
ual labour income might have been used more often.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.
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